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Introduction 
Anonymity is under attack. In a process that started decades ago, an increasing 
multiplicity of forces is creating a slow, but steadily rising perfect storm. These 
forces include communication infrastructures like the IP-address-based Internet, 
cellular networks and social media platforms. Exponentially increasing storage and 
processing capabilities are now mounting up to big data, to be analysed with 
algorithms evolving out of machine learning. An ever increasing number of 
sensory devices, from surveillance cameras to smartphones, smart cars, smart 
cities to the rise of drones are matched by low cost ways of analysing DNA and 
other biological traces. All such technical forces find their equals in the politics of 
fear; in the extension of the various national security apparatus; in normative 
dreams of transparency, connectivity and justice-via-measurement; and in digital 
capitalism’s competition for more and more data. As a consequence, the end of 
anonymity has been declared as near, or already upon us. But even though this 
special issue is partially motivated by such scenarios, we aim to take a step back. 
Our initial questions are simple: What is that which might be under threat? And 
why should we care? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
∗  Some elements of our conception of anonymity were developed in the context of a 
VolkswagenStiftung funded project ‘Reconfiguring anonymity: Reciprocity, 
identifyability and accountability in transformation’. We thank all our colleagues in 
this project. Further essential input came from Bernd Jürgen Warneken and Carol 
Wittel, as well as from the reviewers and members of the editorial collective of 
ephemera. 
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Conceptualising anonymity 
This special issue is based on the premise that anonymity is always socially 
productive and always produced. With this premise we do not try to establish a 
normative or ethical principle. Our aim is to highlight conditions for, and 
potentials of, anonymous forms of social action and interaction to contribute to 
the making of the social world. Anonymity’s contributions are manifold. Surely 
they include those to radical political action, as anonymity can not only help to 
evade and fight surveillance, but it can also enable particular forms of equality or 
certain forms of speaking out and speaking up. Indeed, the ties of radical politics 
to anonymity are only bound to grow further – an example for this is anonymity’s 
potential to challenge new forms of surplus value extraction in the data economy. 
However, at the same time we know all too well that hate speech or attacks on the 
values and practices of doubting and challenging truth claims thrive under 
anonymous constellations, too. And indeed, all such forms and potentials – be it 
for politics of the radical left or its opposite – are part of an even larger field of the 
social productivity and production of anonymity in general: a field that is not only 
marked by various and often contradictory ethical and political potentials, but also 
by a plethora of forms, constellations, practices, actors and outcomes. 
It is the aim of this issue to explore this wider field. We aim to explore how the 
productivity and production of anonymity contribute to the making of the social 
world (which includes, but exceeds radical politics.) Given that anonymity plays a 
significant role in the constitution of the social world, it received for a long time 
less theoretical attention than one might expect. But this situation has started to 
change profoundly. As anonymity is seen as both under threat, and threatening – 
both claims are often tied to digital media –, the topic of anonymity has generated 
a small boom of research in a variety of disciplines. Anonymity has thus become a 
topic in organisation studies (Rossiter and Zehle, 2014; Scott, 2013), media and 
communications (Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2015; Lovink, 2011,), philosophy 
(Halpin, 2012, Ponesse, 2013; Vogelmann, 2012), history (Pabst, 2011; Starner et 
al, 2011), literature studies (Griffin, 2003, Mullan, 2007), sociology (Bauman, 
2012; Hirschauer, 2010; Rost, 2003; Wiedemann, 2012), information science 
(Tsikerdekis, 2013), geography and urban studies (Garber, 2000). Some 
disciplines can draw on more intensive traditions of engagement: these entail 
social psychology (Huang and Li, 2016), law and legal studies (Kerr et al., 2009) 
and cryptography, mathematics and computer science (Danezis and Diaz, 2008) 
as well as the new, specialised surveillance studies (Lyon, 2007; Marx, 2015).  
While it is notable that the topic has seen a rise of attention in a multiplicity of 
disciplines, it is also remarkable how little acknowledgement or discussion there 
is across them. 
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We conceptualise anonymity, as many of the aforementioned authors do, as 
constellations of partial unknowability, invisibility and untrackability. However, 
such a short definition hides as much as it clarifies. The editorial collective of this 
special issue consists of scholars based in social anthropology, German european 
ethnology, cultural and media studies. We assume that the constellations of 
anonymity emerge in complex intersections, entailing and combining, amongst 
others, social practices, technologies and infrastructures, ethics and politics. 
Ethnographies give us a particularly rich access to such intersections: Lock’s 
ethnography of organ transplantation (2001), Konrad’s (2005) and Klotz’s (2014) 
work on egg and sperm donation, Copeman’s comparative inquiries into blood 
donation (2009), Frois’ exploration of anonymity in self-help groups (2009), 
Loeber’s ethnography of imageboards (2011), Coleman’s study of the online 
collective Anonymous (2014) and the Tactical Tech Collective’s research into 
anonymised online visibility of marginalised communities of activists in Kenya 
and South Africa (Ganesh et al., 2016) are examples of research that discuss the 
complexities of situated anonymity. 
Ethnography’s attention to the complexities of situated anonymity can come at the 
cost of making systematic claims across different case studies. At the same time, 
it enables us to map a plethora of forms and appearances: anonymity exists in 
highly regulated and highly random settings, it appears in intentional and non-
intentional forms, it is sometimes a protective shield against the outside of a given 
social configuration, and sometimes a trait of the relations contained within. It can 
be welcomed and embraced, but it can also be instituted as a regime upon 
unwilling participants. It can invite reciprocity or deliberately foreclose reciprocity. 
It can be both a condition and a process. It is amorphous and transient. It is 
situational and context-specific. It is therefore a category that defies easy ways of 
modeling and framing, but also a category that opens up a structured field of 
potential properties. 
The authors of this issue contribute to a mapping of this field with ethnographic, 
theoretical, experimental and artistic forms of research. The social production and 
productivity of anonymity gives the issue its overarching theme. In the following 
passages we will first explore the social productivity of anonymity. Then we will 
turn to questions that investigate how anonymity is socially produced. We will 
conclude with introductions to the papers that make up the special issue. 
On anonymity’s social productivity 
Stating that anonymity is socially productive, means more than that is produces 
desirable outcomes. Anonymity’s contributions to the making of the social world 
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can, but do not have to be desirable. Not only are there different ethics and politics 
at stake. Some of anonymity’s forms might be undesirable from almost every 
possible ethical stance, but they still contribute to the making of the social world. 
At the same time, thinking about what is a stake in the social productivity of 
anonymity cannot evade ethical and political questions. The conflicted social, 
moral, and legal significance of anonymity is reflected, for example, in 
controversial domains such as baby drop-off boxes and anonymous births, the 
anonymous donation of organs, gametes, and blood, or peer reviewing and 
application procedures. To give a sketch of what is at stake, when anonymity co-
produces social worlds, we therefore want to start with exploring how anonymity 
is tied to a fundamental set of values associated with the European enlightenment: 
liberté, egalité and fraternité. 
This is nowhere as apparent as in liberté. In times of a growing surveillance 
apparatus, with technologies ranging from networked databases to biometric 
identification and ever improving recognition algorithms, all matched by moral 
imperatives that celebrate transparency and openness, anonymity has the potential 
to protect and enable freedom – partial, fragile and privileged freedom, but 
freedom nonetheless. Anonymity’s liberté is, to evoke Isaiah Berlin’s ([1958] 1969) 
distinction, negative: It is a freedom from being fully visible for the governmental 
surveillance apparatus, from social and cultural restraints, and, indeed, from 
accountability. Freedom from accountability can also, in its best moments, 
produce new possibilities and foster the courage to speak truth to power (see 
Trytko and Wittel, this issue). The social productivity of anonymity lies here in an 
increase of social space and subjective possibilities. The same social space for 
freedom has then, in turn, all the characteristics, including the chances and perils 
of the liberal ideas around freedom. Without systematically questioning whose 
freedom it is, at whose expense, and for what purpose it is used, freedom can 
quickly become a space for the accumulation of unaccountable power. 
But anonymity’s freedom does not stop here. It also increases freedom with 
respect to the data we produce. This is not fully new neither. Ethnographers grant 
anonymity to their interlocutors so that they may speak freely without fears of 
being reprimanded by others. Journalists promise anonymity to their sources and 
informants. But with respect to the data we produce being online, and to the value 
chains of the new data economy, anonymity has recently undergone massive 
reconfigurations. In the new context of ‘communicative capitalism’ (Dean, 2014), 
‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff, 2015), and ‘platform capitalism’ (Srnicek, 2016), 
our social life is being transformed into valuable data. This is a new form of 
capitalist enclosure. Our connections, social relationships, and friendships have 
become valuable information, or more precisely, have become information with a 
significant exchange value. This extraction of data from our social life and its 
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transformation into a commodity is a capture of what once was a common good. 
However, online anonymity is a severe obstacle for those who operate in the data 
extraction, data analysis, and data trade business. While online anonymity, even 
on a mass scale and in the most radical forms, would not put a stop to the data 
economy, it would surely devalue the extracted data significantly. In such a 
constellation anonymity can foster a freedom from the commodification of the 
social. 
Less immediately visible but just as important are the ties of anonymity to the other 
two values in Robespierre’s well-worn triad. But anonymity has a welcoming effect 
on egalité, too. Equality can be promoted by anonymity, particularly in situations 
in which social actors are mutually anonymous to each other. Categories in social 
life often produce hierarchies, such as age, class, gender, ethnicity and education. 
If information on these categories is not available to those who interact 
anonymously, hierarchies between them cannot be established easily. Anonymity 
is then able to create more equality. In the words of British anthropologist 
Copeman, it can operate as a ‘critical site of social change’, specifically in the way 
‘it comes to act as an instrument of re-composition of an array of associations, 
relationships and institutions’ (Copeman, 2009: 2). The work anonymity is doing 
here is aimed at a momentary or temporarily extended de-institutionalisation of 
classificatory systems and towards an unmaking of status inequality. Let’s look at 
the example of the academic convention called double-blind peer review. Even 
though peer reviewing is in many ways a rather problematic convention, the non-
disclosure of both the author’s name and the reviewer’s name can help creating a 
more equal relationship between these two parties. The same is true for 
anonymous self-help groups: the deep and intense relationships between attenders 
of self-help groups are created on the foundations of anonymity (see Frois, 2009; 
Helm, this issue). We are all equal in front of the demon alcohol, so to speak. 
Even fraternité is tied to anonymity. Anonymity’s capability of traversing cultural 
differences can lead to new forms of sharing, communality and collaboration. 
Sisterhood is difficult to define. We understand fraternité as a specific state of care 
for each other. A brother or a sister is someone with whom we have strong and 
lasting bonds, someone who gets our attention without much need for 
justification. We find anonymous structures of sisterhood in various sizes, from 
inter-personal relations, to groups, and to large-scale collectives such as commons-
based peer production initiatives (Wikipedia, open-source community) or online 
activism (Anonymous). Anonymous self-help groups (see Helm, this issue) are 
also a great example for fraternité. These groups embody and represent indeed our 
understanding of an organisation with a distinctive state of care for each other. 
Anonymity is the undisputed foundation on which strong and caring relationships 
can grow between the members. On a larger scale, the scale of the collective, 
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fraternité is a coming together of individuals and groups from various 
backgrounds in solidarity for a common political cause (Warneken, 2016). 
Anonymity also helps to create such structures of collectivity, for example through 
the performance of being and becoming part of a larger collective, of being-one in 
a mass. 
To discuss the close ties of anonymity with central values of the French Revolution 
underlines the fact that anonymity is a foundational concept of Western 
modernity. However, Western modernity is, of course, not to be reduced to this set 
of rather elevated values. And indeed, anonymity has contributed to modernity’s 
darker sides, too. One example is the anonymisation of weapons at a distance, 
which reaches its conclusions in modern weapons of mass destruction. Or take 
another fundamental trait of modernity, as we currently know it: The economy of 
money and commodities. The buyer does not need to know the producer of the 
commodity. The same applies to capital owners and investors. Both commodity 
fetishism and reification can not be reduced to anonymity but neither can they be 
understood without it. Anonymity is deeply ingrained in capitalist relations of 
production. 
There are multiple ways of being modern in the world today, and by far not all of 
them are exclusively modern. Pre-modern forms of anonymity, and its successors 
in the present, have their own forms. Masks and other disguises have long had 
significant roles, especially in ritualised and spiritual contexts. The notion of 
multiple modernities is helpful in redirecting dichotomies of traditional versus 
modern or the West vs. the Rest towards an acknowledgement of multiple forms 
of being contemporary (Fabian, 1991) in interconnected worlds. Placing the 
question of anonymity’s social productivity centre stage thus entails the necessity 
to recognise that concepts of anonymity often implicitly build on Western 
assumptions and categories. To give an example, the symbolic, social and practical 
act of conferring a name as a marker of individuality and personhood is common 
to all human societies but it can come in many forms. Not always are state related 
forms of governmentality involved, nor is name-giving necessarily tied to the 
cascade of ‘isolational effects’ (Trouillot, 2001) so typical of Western nation states 
that model individuals as autonomous within unspecified publics and relate them 
with each other along pre-given systems of identification. If namelessness as one 
form of anonymity is seen as the other side of the coin of name-giving, it becomes 
obvious that its social and symbolic meanings will differ with respect to the social 
orders and exchanges to which a name grants access. 
The implied naturalness of Western ways of conceptualising anonymity needs to 
be made explicit for two reasons. For one, it is instrumental in opening up 
analytical sensibilities to the multiple trajectories and historical contexts in which 
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anonymity stands. Such an acknowledgement entails that we grasp the wide array 
of possibilities in which anonymity, as a way of ‘undoing the person’ has to be 
conceptualised as the other side of getting to know a person or even ‘making’ a 
person in very different historical contexts and societies. Secondly, we might be 
able to rethink anonymity’s productivity for the Western context on the basis of 
alternative ways to create relationality and the person. An anonymous person 
might be easier to conceptualise with ideas about personhood from the highlands 
of Papua New Guinea in mind, than on the basis of an imaginative canvas of 
identity concepts that dominate our life in the West. The examination of (or the 
immersion into) alternative ways of understanding object-person relations, social 
forms and orderings of private property/the commons has the capacity to sensitise 
us for what might be one of the most productive potentials of anonymity: to 
recompose existing foundational relations, institutions, and social forms. 
On anonymity’s production 
Anonymity can be produced in various ways: socially, discursively, technically or 
legally. What is produced is an absence of information. Few authors, who write 
about anonymity, miss the opportunity to mention that the word anonymity is 
rooted etymologically in ἀνωνυμία, the Greek word for the absence of ὄνομα, 
the ‘name’ (Liddell and Scott, 1996) Indeed, the absence of a name gives us an 
entry into conceptualising anonymity, since the name is a central hub for 
connecting information to our persona and our bodies (Marx, 1999). However, 
anonymity can clearly not be reduced to the question of namelessness. Even if we 
are nameless, we might still not be faceless – a fact that gains new significance in 
an age of ubiquitous surveillance cameras and face recognition, driven by machine 
learning algorithms. Indeed, as Nissenbaum (1999) pointed out, it is neither 
name- nor face- but tracelessness that has become the most endangered trait of 
anonymity in recent decades, as we are communicating online, while spreading 
offline our all too easily readable genetic material. After all, who needs a name, 
when you have an IP address and DNA? Or when you use a specialised sensory 
device also known as a smart phone? Anonymity is obviously a condition that 
changes historically, and its production does so, too. Indeed, anonymity is situated 
in a cluster of concepts, all of which are undergoing historical changes. This cluster 
includes terms such as privacy as well as crowd, loneliness as well as 
confidentiality, and multiple opposites ranging from transparency and 
surveillance to individual and common property. 
To produce constellations of anonymity can mean a plethora of practices. 
Anonymity can, for example, describe the state where a conversation happens in 
full public, for anyone to perceive, but with no one knowing who is talking. But it 
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can also refer to a situation, where two or more people who know each other have 
an intimate conversation, but shield it from others. Both situations can legitimately 
be described as anonymous, however they lead to almost opposite social and 
communicative arrangements. There are more of such ambivalent meanings. Take 
the example of namelessness again. The name is an indexical sign, usually attested 
by the nation state, connecting events or acts or a piece of information to a person 
and a body. Namelessness can thus denote both a body without a name (such as a 
person roaming the streets anonymously) and an act, which we cannot tie to an 
identifiable subject (such as an anonymous graffiti message). Even something as 
simple as namelessness describes a variety of forms that cut connections. 
Such connections and their cuts have their own temporality. When we try to evade 
surveillance by the state, for example, it is often essential that we not only produce 
anonymity in the present, but in the foreseeable future too. In this case anonymity 
has to entail an inevitably fragile effort to control the future – an effort that is 
especially tenuous, if the data is out there in principle, but not (yet) connected to 
our name. We therefore need assurances that these connections won’t be made in 
the future. The German Federal Data Protection Act defines ‘rendering 
anonymous’ as a ‘modification of personal data so that the information concerning 
personal or material circumstances can no longer or only with a disproportionate 
amount of time, expense and labour be attributed to an identified or identifiable 
individual’ (BDSG §3/61). Note the rather careful phrasing that exempts anonymity 
from the need to be able to withstand ‘disproportionate amount of time, expense 
and labour’: without such an exemption, anonymity might hardly ever pass the 
legal test. 
The same formulation of ‘time, expense and labour’ also points to the different 
actors that are involved in the present and in the potential future. Complex 
databases, for example, usually have a maze of domain-specific access 
authorisations, including the manifold authorisations to provide authorisations to 
others, as well as the authorisations to authorise authorisations. All this is far from 
trivial once we take into account that databases do not only contain already existing 
knowledge, that is information, which is explicitly stated in the database. Rather, 
once databases reach a certain complexity, they are also full of potential knowledge, 
ready to be actualised, once new connections are made: a database might not 
contain a name, but enough information to deduct it, once certain bits of 
information are linked with each other. Anonymity can often only be protected 
through the deliberate construction of artificial boundaries. Complex systems of 
authorisations are one possible way to achieve this. This in turn can further 
complicate the matter. When those whose information is documented in a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1  BDSG stands for Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act. 
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database wish to protect parts of their anonymity, they often need to demand that 
the anonymity of those handling their data is unveiled. Anonymity can require 
transparency. 
If we look at anonymity in acts of communication, the situation becomes even 
more complicated. The anonymous network Tor for example does not only keep 
the senders and receivers of messages anonymous, but also the hubs, which 
transfer the messages. One might think that such a method is ideal; however, a 
relevant critique of Tor is that this arrangement fails to ensure that only 
trustworthy and known hubs selected by those who communicate through this 
network, are the ones providing the communicational infrastructure. For all these 
reasons there is hardly ever total anonymity, neither temporally, nor socially, nor 
technically: ‘Anonymity is never perfectly complete’ (Wallace, 1999: 25). No 
wonder that intentional anonymity can only exist with a certain amount of trust. 
In all the above examples, anonymity is produced intentionally. There are, 
however, forms of anonymity, which are non-intentional. Think for example of the 
anonymity of urban spaces, which became an important topic for early 20th century 
sociologists such as Simmel (1971/1903); the anonymity of people passing by each 
other as strangers in the streets of metropoles; the anonymity of citizens living in 
the same urban neighbourhood. To solve this confusion it makes sense to 
distinguish between the state of anonymity on the one hand and the act of 
anonymisation on the other. Anonymisation is the process of intentionally 
producing constellations of partial unknowability, invisibility and untrackability. 
Often intentional anonymity – if successful – consists of a long chain of intentions 
in which the first step secures the anonymisation whereas the next steps are 
designed to uphold this state over time. Anonymity can be, but does not have to 
be, produced by (intentional) anonymisation. It can be its outcome, but also the 
outcome of other processes such as modernity or urbanisation, or more generally 
of unintended socio-material processes and constellations, in which identifying 
information is dis-associated from a person or simply vanishes. Therefore 
anonymity is always socially produced, albeit only sometimes intentionally. 
If we ask how anonymisation in a digital environment can be achieved and 
maintained, it makes sense to knock on the doors of today’s specialists for such an 
endeavour: computer scientists. Here we can learn that anonymity is attained by 
blurring either the sender in larger sets of senders, or the receiver in larger sets of 
receivers, or the message in a larger set of messages, or some, or all of these 
elements in their respective sets – potentially in combination with blurring the 
respective sets in even bigger sets (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2010; see also the 
interview with Marit Hansen in this issue). Such blurring in ‘anonymity sets’ 
prevents an ‘attacker’ from singling out specific entities in the blur of the set. In 
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computing, relations of anonymity are never dyadic for two reasons. Firstly, being 
anonymous means to be part of a larger set of other entities. Secondly, we are, at 
least in computing, only ever anonymous-for-an-attacker. This ‘attacker’ is not 
necessarily malicious, but simply an abstraction, a representation of a given entity 
that might want to know something we don’t want it to know. Cryptography always 
solves the double problem of encoding messages and/or senders and/or receivers 
in ways that unintended ‘attackers’ cannot decode, while intended receivers can. 
Indeed, the mathematical discussions of cryptographers are inhabited by a whole 
range of standardised fictional characters: ‘Alice’ (for receiver) and ‘Bob’ (for 
sender) are trying to communicate, but not without ‘Eve’ (for eavesdropper), 
‘Carol’ (for the third person), ‘Chuck’ (a malicious participant), ‘Mallet’ (the active 
intruder), ‘Trent’ (the trusted third party) and ‘Grace’ (the government 
representative) all having their role to play. Therefore it is impossible to 
understand anonymity if we make the mistake to conceptualise it simply in one 
single dyadic relation.2 
The abstract yet precise models of computing can cater for many of the 
constellations of anonymity. However, the abstraction, purification and 
formalisation of code and its mathematical logic is not only a strength, but at the 
same time a limitation for social and cultural theorists. Anonymity entails a lot of 
further problems that cannot be explained with such logic. One such example is 
simply the question, what happens to the ‘set’? Remember, for example, that while 
specific entities hide themselves in an ‘anonymity set’, the ‘anonymity set’ itself 
often becomes more visible. Once an ‘anonymity set’ becomes visible, it can take 
on a further social life of its own. The online collective Anonymous, for example, 
turned such a ‘set’ of anonymous entities – the many people who post on specific 
platforms and channels – into a fragile process of collectivisation, joint decision-
making and collective action. While all its members are hiding inside the 
‘anonymity set’, this ‘set’ starts its own life. In such a situation its members do not 
only hide inside the ‘set’, but begin to interact and to use the ‘anonymity set’ as a 
collective weapon (Coleman, 2014). 
Aside from the set and multiple forms of collectivities that can emerge, many other 
social and socio-technical forms are at stake in anonymity: individual relations, 
relations between individuals and organisations, or between organisations, as well 
as socio-technical assemblages. In its most general form, anonymity constitutes a 
specific form of social relation in which a range of potentially identifying markers 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2 This is even the case when two communicating participants are anonymous towards 
each other. While these two are communicating they are senders and receivers, but 
also attackers prevented from identifying each other. Within this constellation of two, 
we thus have three analytical positions: sender, receiver and attacker. 
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of individuality and difference are dissociated from specific individuals (see 
Ponesse, 2013). It is neither a form of a-sociality nor the ‘ultimate symbol of 
incoexistence’ (Konrad, 2005: 5), but rather in itself a social form and a form of 
sociality. Such a perspective opens up a new set of questions: How many 
identifying markers can be dissociated in a social relationship for it to still exist? 
What kind of ‘relations of non-relationality’ (Konrad, 2005) emerge here? How can 
fundamental traits of social relationships such as reciprocity, trust or 
accountability be ensured? Which webs of relationships emerge around the 
anonymous relationship itself? Who are the gatekeepers of anonymity, who 
become the guarantors of trust, and who are its beneficiaries and victims? How 
can anonymity trigger ‘congregational thoughts’ (Copeman, 2009: 7), new forms 
of solidarity and different rationalities of identity not necessarily connected to 
property assumptions? What forms of intimacy and confidentiality arise, and what 
happens to parrhesia, the speaking of truth, when the speaker is hidden? 
Adding to the complexities of anonymity is a further grey area: the subtleties of 
open secrets (Curtis/Weir 2016) and non-knowledge in general. We might, for 
example, stabilise social situations by ignoring what we could know – including 
identifying information. These are Goffman-esque forms of anonymity. Take for 
example the moment in a double-blind peer review process, when the author 
recognises the person who produced the peer review, or more commonly, when 
the peer-reviewer recognised the author(s). To keep the conventions of the peer 
review’s ‘ongoing panoptic organization of communication’ (Hirschauer, 2010: 
72) intact, it often makes sense to separate between a front stage, where anonymity 
is formally acknowledged by all sides, and a backstage, where this is not the case. 
The convention of the double-blind peer-review is only one of the many examples, 
where non-knowledge of identifying information can greatly matter. Such 
dissonances between front and backstage only point us to a much larger issue, to 
the performative dimensions of anonymity. 
While anonymity therefore has to be analysed in specific situations, it nevertheless 
has to take into account larger contexts. Context refers to a heterogeneity of 
interacting factors such as technologies, infrastructures, values and laws. What 
standards, protocols, codes, technologies and aesthetics are shaping anonymity? 
How are they designed, decided upon, regulated and changed? What are the laws, 
regulations, and social conventions that structure, shape, or undermine 
anonymous forms of interaction? Which role play moral and ethical discourses? 
How do they contribute toward a legitimisation or delegitimisation of anonymity? 
Last but not least: how do hierarchical settings and relations of power and 
domination shape anonymity? Is it imposed, as an act of violence, against the will 
of those who are being anonymised (Natanson, 1986)? Or is it used, as a strategic 
move, to circumvent, undermine, abolish, or even reverse relationships of power? 
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To summarise: We started with a broad diagnosis that anonymity is under attack. 
We then unpacked our two basic assumptions: anonymity is socially productive, 
as well as produced. In both its productivity and production, anonymity is a 
category that defies easy ways of modelling and framing, yet sets up a structured 
field of properties. The tensions and connections within this highly complex, yet 
structured field of properties might never be ordered in a satisfactory way, but they 
nevertheless present social theorists with a persistent and insistent requirement 
for precision. Any attempt to theorise anonymity has to deal with a conceptual 
messiness on the one hand, and a call and opportunity for precise analysis on the 
other hand. 
We will now introduce the contributions in this special issue. 
The contributions 
Daniel de Zeeuw’s article ‘Immunity from the image: The right to privacy as an 
antidote to anonymous modernity’ opens our issue with an exploration of two 
different forms of anonymity. On the one hand, anonymity can be seen as a means-
to-an-end to achieve a specific form of privacy. On the other hand, anonymity can 
describe a specific form of sociality. In a genealogical enquiry into legal and 
philosophical debates in the 18th, 19th and early 20th century in the US and Europe, 
de Zeeuw shows that these two meanings of anonymity are both distinct and 
connected: the merger of anonymity and privacy arose out of class-specific 
anxieties over mass modernity and mass culture, which were perceived as 
alienating and impersonal. To re-establish an analytically sound idea of 
anonymous sociality requires its dissociation from ideas around anonymity as a 
means for privacy, as well as from the latter’s origins in bourgeois fear. 
A similar demand to contextualise anonymity, as well as the debates and discourse 
around it, in specific historical, social, political and geographical conditions drives 
the analysis of Kornelia Trytko and Andreas Wittel in their article ‘The exposure of 
Kataryna: How Polish journalists and bloggers debate online anonymity’. 
Analysing a case study of a Polish blogger who became an influential voice in the 
Polish public sphere, only to be doxed, Trytko and Wittel show two things. Firstly, 
they explore the issues that are negotiated in and through the debates around this 
case of de-anonymisation, including the nature of the public sphere, the status of 
journalists and bloggers, and the state of democracy as well as citizens’ autonomy 
in Poland. Secondly, they provide a passionate defence of anonymity, showing how 
the debates and the conflicts have ultimately enriched the Polish public sphere. 
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‘On anonymity in disasters’, an article by Katrina Petersen, Monika Büscher, and 
Catherine Easton puts equally much emphasis on the context in which anonymous 
data and anonymous relationships are produced and maintained. Analysing 
disaster and emergency management, the authors start from the premise that 
anonymity is neither a state nor something that happens in isolation. All 
individuals and organisations involved in disaster management have to balance 
the requirement for data protection with the urgency of the situation and the need 
to share data across various socio-technical systems. Here anonymity and 
anonymisation can sometimes get in the way and obstruct the most efficient 
responses to emergencies. In particular the authors explore disaster information 
and anonymity with respect to two moments, (1) how anonymous sources of 
information are dealt with, and (2) how protected data is shared between different 
agencies. 
‘What can self-organised group therapy teach us about anonymity?’ – asks Paula 
Helm in a case study that explores anonymity in mutual support groups such as 
Alcoholics Anonymous, groups that fundamentally rely on anonymity to prevent 
possible stigmatisation and discrimination. Her contribution focuses in particular 
on various functions of anonymity. Some of these functions structure the social 
dynamics and the social distances within anonymous therapeutic groups, others 
organise the political communication and the public relation between the group 
and the outside world, and some functions are about the formation of a specific 
subjectivity as well as a sense of belonging to a specific collective. Helm suggests 
a typology of forms of anonymity to facilitate future research and more 
differentiated discussions on the merits and dangers of anonymity in a digital age. 
In his contribution ‘Archaeology of no names? The social productivity of 
anonymity in archaeological information process’, Isto Huvila investigates the 
‘labour of faceless individuals of the past and present’. He analyses the relations 
and overlaps between named and anonymous individuals and institutions as a 
control regime of information and draws specific attention to the role of writing in 
mediating between anonymous and non-anonymous work. While the productivity 
of anonymity – as a glue or enabler, for example – is in parts quite evident, other 
effects and outcomes of anonymity within archaeology remain hard to judge, 
meander between openness and vulnerability and remain ultimately dependent on 
specific situations and contexts. 
‘Images of anonymity’ by Andreas Broeckmann offers a special gift: a curated 
visual essay. The essay does not intend to present an exhaustive overview of visual 
representations of anonymity. Rather, it explores a diverse field of entitlements, 
agencies and power relations within anonymous constellations and social forms. 
Playful and terrified at the same time, we follow the visual representation of 
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identity markers and their opposites through the picture-text arrangement and 
encounter violence and suppression as well as nonchalance and new modes of 
identification and existence. 
Renee Ridgway’s note ‘Against a personalisation of the self’ presents tentative 
results of an on-going research project on personalisation. In a series of 
experiments, Ridgway compares online search results that she either achieves 
while allowing herself to be personalised by Google, or by using the anonymity 
network Tor. In a paradoxical twist, so the analysis of Ridgway shows, 
personalisation forces her into uncontrollable associations with anonymous 
clusters, whereas anonymous research allows membership, and, indeed, agency 
as part of a collective of anonymous users. Standing at the core of the Internet’s 
power structures, personalisation thus contributes to the ‘tragedy of the web’, 
whereas evading personalisation through anonymisation is a chance to continue 
to explore its potentials. 
Paula Bialski and Götz Bachmann have conducted an interview with Marit 
Hansen, a computer scientist, and the head of the Independent Centre for Data 
Protection in Kiel, Germany. Together with her colleague, the late Andreas 
Pfitzmann, Hansen co-authored an article, which provided an influential 
contribution to synthesise and stabilise the terminology around anonymity in 
computer science. The terminology developed by Hansen and Pfitzmann aims to 
cater both for the mathematical precision needed to build systems, as well as for a 
terminological common ground to think about anonymity together with members 
of other disciplines. As such, it is a theory of anonymity in itself, albeit a rather 
abstract one, and firmly rooted in computing. The interview revisits the article, and 
explores how concepts from computer science can enrich the thinking of 
disciplines that are more familiar with qualitative approaches than with the logic 
of computing. 
Final remarks 
One thing that all papers of this issue demonstrate is that diagnoses claiming the 
nearing end of anonymity are oversimplified. While anonymity clearly is under 
attack, while processes of de-anonymisation are undeniably taking place, 
anonymity is not dying a slow death, not yet. Instead regimes of anonymity are 
getting reconfigured and we need to be able to better understand how exactly such 
transformations of anonymity are affecting the multiplicity of our social practices 
and what kind of new dimensions of the social they entail. 
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Both academic and non-academic discourses on anonymity are often oriented to 
explain the workings of anonymity through reference to normative questions and 
terms. The diagnosis of merits and dangers, of allegedly good and bad aspects of 
anonymity is part of such a predominantly moral evaluation. In contrast our 
purpose is to analyse anonymity on the basis of qualitative empirical case studies 
and to portray it as a social form. We hope to contribute to an analysis of anonymity 
as a practice of doing the social that aligns technical, infrastructural, political, and 
regulative dimensions. We draw attention to its production and productivity, and 
with it to its temporalities, its transformative powers and its entanglements with 
practices of person making, property relations, public spheres and social forms. 
However, we are not completely disinterested bystanders in this debate – without 
anonymity the social world would be poorer. It would be reduced in quantitative 
and qualitative terms. 
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